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ESSAY
Comparative Analysis of Labor
Mediation Using a Bargaining
Strength Model
BY ALViN L. GOLDMAN*
The comparison of different legal systems offers a number of
analytical and research advantages, one of which is that it provides a
laboratory for observing differences and similarities in the ways in which
common regulatory and dispute resolution models operate in similar and
dissimilar environments. This Essay uses that laboratory to illustrate how
the bargaining strength model presented in Settling for More: Mastering
Negotiation Strategies and Techniques ("Settling for More")' can be
applied in analyzing mediatory interventions and provide a better
understanding of (a) how such interventions can be utilized most
effectively, (b) when they are useful, (c) when they are superfluous, and
(d) when they are unduly intrusive.
The term "mediation" does not carry the same meaning in all
industrial relations systems. In this Essay, "mediation!' is intended to
encompass the full range of methods by which a party whose interests are
not directly involved attempts to aid negotiating parties in reaching a
settlement. Thus, as used here, "mediation' includes all third-party
interventions, regardless of the distinctions made in some countries
between "conciliation!' and "mediation." Similarly, as used in this Essay,
* Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B.
1959, Columbia University; LL.B. 1962, New York University.
'See ALVIN L. GOLDMAN, SE'ING FOR MOPE: MASTERING NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 3-26 (1991) (discussing the bargaining strength model).
2 Alvin L. Goldman, Settlement ofDiaputes Over Interests, COMPARATIvE LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 481, 483 n.1
(Roger Blainpain & Cbris Engels eds., 5th ed. 1993). See, e.g., KAZUO SUGENO,
JAPANESE LABOR LAw at 612-14 (Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992) (discussing the distinction
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"mediation' descnbes mandatory as well as voluntary procedures'
leveraged as well as nonleveraged interventions,4 and settlement
assistance by wholly impartial as well as by partially interested persons
American literature regarding mediation (and all methods of third-
party intervention subsumed in this Essay's use of the word) most often
is descriptive or prescriptive and predominantly focuses on portraying
tactics and procedural protocols.' Little that has been published in
English can be accurately characterized as analytical; that which can be
labeled as analytical either (a) largely relates to the psychodynamics or
ethics of particular tactics or protocols, (b) consists of empirical
observations regarding skill levels in applying specific techniques, or (c)
establishes empirically based correlations between particular techniques
and bargaining outcomes Efforts have been made to compare the
between mediation and conciliation under Japanese law).
3 Goldman, supra note 2, at 498.
' Id.; see also Alvin L. Goldman, Third Party Intervention in Resolving Interests
Disputes, 10 CoM. LAB. L.J. 271, 272-73 (1989) (discussing leveraged mediation).
Leveraged mediation is where the third-party intervenor has the potential to impose terms
of settlement or impose special burdens or procedures if proposals are rejected. In some
societies, the effectiveness of social pressure may result in published third-party
recommendations having the impact of leveraged mediation. See, e.g., SUGENO, sspra
note 2, at 613 (discussing the conditions in which mediations are carried out by the Labor
Commission in Japan).
' Political mediators, for example, often are partially interested intervenors in labor
disputes either because an alliance with one of the parties exists or because the settlement
might affect the success of a program or election. See Tiziano Treu, The Role of Neutrals
in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in Italy, 10 COM. LAB. L.J. 374, 379-80 (1989)
(discussing how regional governments in Italy sometimes intervene on the basis of the
'Integrative' powers they possess in labor matters).
6 Deborah M. Kolb, How Existing Procedures Shape Alternatives: The Case of
Grievance Mediation, 1989 J. OF Dis1. RESOL. 59, 65 ("In sum, much scholarship in
mediation.., is based, for the most part, on a concept of process that is defined either
as a set of procedural characteristics or as clusters of tactics."); see also NANCY H.
ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEwEN, MEDIATION LAw, POLICY, PRACTiCE, passim (1989)
(discussing statutes and court opinions related to mediation and conciliation); SUSAN M.
LEESON & BRYAN M. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT, DWs=u RESOLUTION IN AMERICA 105,
133-39 (1988) (discussing the background and the process of mediation); WILLIAM E.
SWIMN & NICHOLAS A. FIDANDIS, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIV
BARGAINING, passini (2d ed. 1986) (discussing mediation as a major element in dispute
resolution); WALTER A. MAGGIOLO, TEcHNIQuEs Op MEDIATION, passim (1985)
(discussing mediation techniques and the use of mediation in other dispute resolution
procedms).
7 See DEBORAH M. KoLB, THE MEDIATORS 134-49 (1983) (discussing the
connection between the mediator's strategic activities and the outcomes of his efforts);
Janette Webb, Behavioral Studies of Third-Pafly Intervention, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS:
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efficiency and outcomes of mediation in relation to similar nonmediated
negotiations,' but these comparisons have not been couched in terms of how
mediation affects the determinants of negotiated outcomes. Accordingly,
existing scholarship respecting mediation contains a significant void: Current
scholarship lacks a model or models for analyzing, in terms of the parties'
bargaining power, strategic choices available to mediators and for assessing,
in terms of the effect upon the parties'bargaining power, legal standards and
regulations of mediation. This Essay addresses that void.
Since the target of mediation most often is defined as helping the parties
achieve a negotiated settlement, proper analysis of the mediator role
involves understanding the forces that drive bargainers to settlement or
impasse. Achieving this understanding requires the identification of the
elements of bargaining strength and of the relationship between those
elements and the conditions under which both sides are prepared to settle.
Therefore, in order to gain a cohesive and coherent understanding of how
mediation affects bargaining, a model to describe bargaining power and
explain its impact upon negotiated settlements is necessary. The task of
developing and presenting a comprehensive model of bargaining strength was
undertaken in Settling for More. Hence, this Essay analysis of mediation
begins with the bargaining strength model described and explained in that
book.
The starting proposition in understanding bargaining is that bargaining
power is wholly dependent upon each party perceptions of the elements of
bargaining strength. In other words, negotiation is driven not by reality, but
by the participants'perceptions of reality. Thus, the most pervasive element
of bargaining strength is each side's perceptions. The analytical significance
of this principle is heightened by the fact that it separates the model presented
in Setlingfor More and similar perception-based models from market-based
microeconomic paradigms.0 The market-based approach ultimately operates
A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 309 (Geoffrey M. Stephenson & Christopher J.
Brotherton eds., 1979) (discussing the extent of the research concerning the psychological
aspects of third-party intervention).
' See Webb, supra note 7, at 312-21 (discussing the experimental study of
mediation).
' MAGGIOLO, sigra note 6, at 3-4 ("[IThe professional mediator facilitates the
meeting-of-minds process and by voluntary means and methods re-emphasizes the prime
responsibility of the disputant parties to seek their own solution compatible with the
public interest").
10 GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 5. In contrast to the weight given to individual
perception in perception-based models, market-based microeconomic paradigms merely
plot "an abstract notion of what variables would influence a price if all potential buyers
and sellers were solely profit motivated." Id. For a more detailed explanation of market-
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on the assumption that market decisions are made by wholly rational people
who base their decisions on accurate, complete knowledge-that is, the
decision-making process is controlled not by perception, but by reality. The
perception-based model, in contrast, assumes that negotiating decisions are
made by people who are driven by emotion and by reasoning based on their
perceptions, even if those perceptions are the product of imagination,
deception, ignorance, irrationality, or the like.
Perceptions are neither fixed nor uniform. Rather, perceptions are shaped
by a persons capacity to observe, collate, store, and recall information that
has been altered by the inevitable distractions and limitations upon that
person ability to hear, see, taste, smell, and feel Perception is additionally
influenced by the way in which a source of information has intentionally or
unintentionally distorted that information when presenting it to the observer.
Equally important, perceptions are absorbed and ordered by more than just
logic. Indeed, logic often plays a minor role. Personal and cultural biases,
personality, and emotional states such as fear, exuberance, or fatigue provide
the mental framework through which we filter, distort, and restructure our
perceptions of events, transactions, information, and people. Some modem
social scientists thus explain that perceptions are formed by the right side as
well as the left side of the brain, so that the emotive as well as the data
processing dimensions of the learning, thinking and remembering processes
are involved. That bargaining tactics and mediation techniques are largely
concerned with the psychodynamics involved in altering perceptions is,
therefore, not surprising.
What, however, are the subjects of the parties' bargaining strength
perceptions? Since bargaining is a decisional process, it is reasonable to use
a cost-benefit model of decision making in order to examine this question.
Themfore, in mapping the elements of bargaining decisions, one should ask
a series of questions: (a) What are the process costs?; (b) What are the lost
opportunity costs?; (c) What are the potential benefits (or gains)?; (d) What
are the risks of error in assessing the costs and benefits?; and (e) What is the
structure of the relationship that links these factors with each other? Settling
for More identifies two sets of bargaining costs: Accrued Costs ("AC"), with
its risk of assessment error referred to as Data Accuracy (DA'), and Cost of
Impending Negotiations ("COIN"), with its risk of assessment error identified
as Predictive Accuracy (TA"). The potential for bargaining benefits is
designated as the Offer to Meet One Needs ("OMON"), with its assessment
based microeconomic paradigms, see generally WALTER NICHOLSON, MIcROECONOMIC
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS (1985) (discussing paradigms, such as
indifferece curve analysis, that microecoomists apply to market theory).
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risk of promised action failing to meet those needs being referred to as
Probability of Performance (TOP"). Finally, the lost opportunity costs are the
Best Alternative to the Proposed Agreement ("BAPA!), with its risk of
assessment error being referred to as Predictive Accurac ("PA").
The bargaining strength model can be presented both graphically and
in algebraic form. In both presentations, each party's bargaining strength is
separately measured by the other sidet perception.' That is, Party A's
bargaining strength is not dependent on what A thinks; rather, it is dependent
on what Party B thinks because an agreement between A and B can be
reached only if B decides that what A is prepared to do is acceptable. Put
another way, ifA thi that what A seeks from B is much more attractive
thanA's alternatives, thenA is prepared to make concessions in order to reach
agreement. Conversely, ifA thinks that Bt offering is less attractive thanA's
alternatives, then A not only will refuse to make concessions but will also
have to get concessions from B in order to reach agreement. Accordingly, if
A' perceptions are favorable to B position, B will deal with A from a
position of bargaining strength. (For example, A thinks that the automobile
B is offering for sale is mechanically sound.) IfA's perceptions are unfavor-
able to B' position, B is in a position of bargaining weakness in dealing with
A. (For example, A thinks that the automobile B is offering for sale is
mechanically defective.) Thus, ifB can alter At perceptions so that they are
favorable to Bb position (and A then decides that what B offers is more at-
tractive thanA's alternatives), B will increase B's bargaining strength. In that
sense, Bb bargaining strength is increased or diminished based on changes in
A' perceptions.
Settling for More describes four paradigms of bargaining strength
analysis. The first two demonstrate the relationship of the elements of
bargaining strength in determining the bargaining power of each side in a
bargaining transaction. The third paradigm combines the first two in order to
illustrate the parties' relative bargaining strength. Finally, the fourth paradigm
shows the conditions under which reasonable negotiators should be able to
reach a settlement. This fourth paradigm, the conditions conducive to
settlement, is the one of most immediate concern in studying mediation. 3
11 A fall explanation of the bargaining strength elements is left to Settling for More,
in which the bargaining strength model is developed. GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 6-52.
However, in order to understand the relationship between the bargaining strength model
and mediation, it is necessary to describe the bargaining strength conditions that are
conducive to achieving a negotiated settlement.
See generally id at 33-52, 233-36 (&tailing the bargaining strength model in both
diagram and algebraic forms).
" 'Mediators ... are concerned not with what they personally may deem to be ajust
settlement but rather what is acceptable to the parties" MAGGIOLO, supa note 6, at 5.
1993-94]
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Diagram 1 represents the fourth paradigm, the conditions conducive to
settlement. This diagram shows that agreement should be attainable as long
as each side perceives that what it expects the other side will do to meet its
needs (OMON and POP), combined with its curent investment in bargaining
with the other side (AC and DA), outweighs what it thinks it will get by
bargaining with someone else (or pursuing an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism-BAPA and PA), combined with what it anticipates it will cost to
continue the current bargaining effort (COIN and PA).
Conditions Conducive to Settlement = A's Perception Of:
POPB + DAA
(A is likely to settle) (A is unlikely to settle)
PLUS B's Perception Of:
POPA DAB
+
(B is likely to settle) (B is unlikely to settle)
OMON = Offer to Meet Other's Needs
POP = Probability of Performance
AC = Accrued Costs
DA = Data Accuracy
PA = Predictive Accuracy
BAPA = Best Alternative to the
Proposed Agreement
COIN = Cost of Impending Negotiations
[Vol 82
BARGAINING STRENGTH MODEL
Diagram 1 illustrates a situation in which both sides are inclined to
reach the proposed settlement. Either side would become less willing to
settle, however, if it reduced its perception of the size of one or both
bargaining strength weights on the left side of the diagram or increased
its perception of the size of one or both weights on the right side. This
situation is demonstrated by Diagram 2, which shows that Party B has
become resistant to settlement. One possible explanation for this
resistance is B's perceptions that further bargaining is going to be
prolonged and involve considerable expense (an increase in the weight
given to COIN in the diagram) and that Party A is unlikely to deliver on
what it offers to do if agreement is reached (a decrease to the weight
given to POP in the diagram). For example, assume that B wants to buy
A's house and that A has offered to sell it. A initially asks $150,000 and
B counters with an offer of $130,000. At this point, one might expect that
with a bit of negotiating the parties would have a good prospect of
reaching agreement. Assume further, however, that B learns that A has
inherited the house together with three relatives, one of whom has
expressed a strong desire to keep the house within the family. This
information should alter B's perception so as to reduce the weight that B
will give to the element of A's probability of performance (POP) and
increase the weight B will give to the costs of impending negotiations
(COIN). The effect of these changes will be to reduce the prospects for
settlement. In order to restore the conditions conducive to settlement, A
will have to do something to reestablish B's original perception of these
bargaining strength elements-such as obtain a signed letter from all ofA's
co-owner relatives that authorizes him to sell the house.
The full significance of the above model and its utility in analyzing
the bargaining process, including the role of mediation in that process,
cannot be fully appreciated without careful examination of the special
characteristics of each bargaining strength element. The needs that each
side seeks to have met by reaching agreement bear an important
relationship with each other. These needs can be common (as is likely
when, for example, an employer and union both want to be able to
predict future wage rates), compatible 14 (as is likely when, for example,
an employer and union are arranging employee vacation schedules),
conflicting (as is likely when, for example, an employer and union are
setting employee wage rates), or incompatible 5 (as is likely when, for
"4 Common or compatible needs are involved in what is termed "integrative"
negotiations or bargaining. GoLmAN, supra note 1, at 10-11, 46, 50-51.
" Conflicting or incompatible needs are involved in what is termed "exchange"
negotiations or bagaining. Id. at 46-50.
1993-94]
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Conditions Not Conducive to Settlement = A's Perception Of:
(Ais likely to settle) (Ais unlikely to settle)
PLUS B's Perception Of:
+
(B is likely to settle)
OMON = Offer to Meet Other's Needs
POP = Probability of Performance
AC = Accrued Costs
DA = Data Accuracy
PAB
(B is unlikely to settle)
PA = Predictive Accuracy
BAPA= Best Alternative to the
Proposed Agreement
COIN = Cost of Impending Negotiations
example, a union seeks to control the selection of shop floor supervisors).
In addition to the varying needs that each side may have, different
sources of needs motivate each side's bargaining conduct. 6 Collective
"' For example, a person may be motivated by "personal idiosyncrasies and
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bargaining concerning employment interests typically involves collective
representation of owners (either by an employers' association or merely
by the directors serving as agents for shareholders) as well as collective
representation of employees, and divergent interests can be present within
each group. Thus, bargaining strength in the labor relations context
cannot be fully understood without exploring the component interests of
each collective group and any competing interests between the group's
representatives and the constituents, or even among different groups
within the constituency.
Moreover, needs can be multidimensional-fiscal, physical, or
emotional. Similarly, full understanding of each of the other bargaining
strength elements (probability of performance, accrued and impending
costs, data and predictive accuracy) requires more intensive analysis of
that element's unique characteristics. This Essay examines only a few of
these bargaining strength elements as a means of better understanding the
mediator's role. 7
Assuming that the primary goal of mediation is to help negotiating
parties reach agreement, one can observe from the bargaining strength
paradigm of the conditions conducive to settlement that the mediator's
responsibility is to aid the parties in finding ways to place greater weight
on the elements on the left side of the diagram than on the elements
shown on the right side. Mediation, however, need not be defined solely
in terms of enabling the parties to reach agreement. Is it not equally
legitimate and useful for a mediator to aid the negotiating parties in
realizing that a mutually beneficial agreement is not attainable?"8 In the
labor relations context, the best alternative to the proposed agreement
may be an adjudicated resolution, as is the case both in grievance
disputes in North America and in situations in which the parties are
subject to contractual or statutory interests arbitration, as they are in a
number of countries.'9 Where parties who enter into negotiations are
emotional needs." Id. at 114.
', For a full exploration of the characteristics of the specific bargaining strength
elements, see Settling for More at 6-25.
" "Mediation is defined most simply as facilitated negotiation. An impartial third
party (the mediator) facilitates negotiations between disputants or the disputants'
representatives in their search for a resolution of their dispute." LESON & JOHNSTON,
supra note 6, at 133.
"9 Grievance procedures established nader a collective agreement inthe United States
and Canada provide an example of the first category-grievance negotiation. Alan
Gladstone, Settlement of Disputes Over Rights, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIA D MA KMT ECONOMIS 455, 470-74 (Roger
Blainpain & Chris Engels eds., 5th ed. 1993). The traditional Australiam system of
1993-94]
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unaware of their alternatives to a proposed settlement (BAPA) or have
unrealistic perceptions regarding the prospects of achieving those
alternatives (PA), a mediator may have to choose between (a) promoting
settlement by perpetuating or even expanding the misperceptions or (b)
educating one of the parties as to why a seemingly attractive offer is not
in that party's best interest.
Accordingly, Hugh Collins argues in a recent book2" that British
conciliation officers subvert the public importance of ensuring procedural
fairness in industrial relations and undermine the substantive interests of
natural justice' He asserts that the conciliation officers press for
settlements because they place more emphasis on the efficient administra-
tion of the Industrial Tribunals system than on their responsibility to help
the employee who appears without counsel develop his or her case in the
best light and weigh any settlement proposals against a realistic as-
sessment of the award that would be likely to result from an adjudicated
resolution? Therefore, according to Collins, many workers accept
collective bargaining offers a classic example of a system in which adjudication rather
than work stoppages serves as the alternative to a negotiated resolution. .E. Isaac & R.C.
McCallum, The Role of Neutral in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in Australia, 10
COM. LAB. L.J 300 (1989) (discussing the role of neutral third parties in the Australian
labor dispute resolution system). A variation of this model is found in the German system
for resolving disputes between a works council and management. Manfred Weiss, The
Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of Interest Disputes in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 10 CoMe. LAB. L.L 339, 348-54 (1989) (discussing the system of bargaining
between employee councils and employers).
20 HUGH CoLLINs, JusnTc IN DISMISsAL: THE LAw OF TERMINTION OF
EMPLOYMENT (1992) (discussing the distribution of power between employer and
employees, especially as related to management's power of dismissal).
2 Id. at 137-39.
" Id. For a review that takes issue with Collins' overall analytical topology and
recommendations for reform, see Gwyneth Pitt, Justice in Dismissal: A Reply to Hugh
Collins, 22 INDUS. L.J. 251 (1993) (arguing that Collins' thesis, which purports to provide
a justificatory framework for existing data or dismissal law, is inadequate as an
interpretation of the principles underlying the existing law of termination). See also Harry
T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HAPV. L. REV.
668 (1986) (discussing the dangers that may accompany alternatives to traditional
litigation).
In the United States, a similar question is hotly debated concerning the role of
mediation as a means of resolving disputes in such areas as divorce and child custody,
discrimination, consumer and environmental affairs, and similar situations in which
noncommercial public interests or individual rights or liberties may be at stake. See JOHN
S. MURRAY E AL., PROCESSES OF DisPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERs 272
(1989) (discussing the issues of power imbalances and fairness as related to the mediation
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settlements that are less favorable than the adjudicated awards would be,
and some issues of substantive importance in the development of sound
labor relations policies are not presented for resolution by the Industrial
Tribunal.
Although it is not the purpose of this Essay to explore the accuracy
of Collins' description or the important policy issue raised by his critique,
an examination of his thesis in terms of the bargaining strength model is
appropriate. Accordingly, looking again at Diagram 1, one can see that
the issue that Collins raises concerns the extent to which the mediator
should focus upon bringing the parties' perceptions in line with reality (or
at least, the mediator's understanding of reality). Collins argues, in effect,
that British conciliation officers have adopted the strategy of calling
attention to the realities only when doing so will enhance the prospects
of settlement.O Thus, if the seemingly impartial intervener, without
regard to the Tribunal's patterns of case decisions, assures a worker that
the proposed settlement is "fair," that assurance likely will increase the
weight that the worker places on the OMON element and thereby
improve the prospects for settlement. Similarly, if that same "impartial"
intervener assures the worker that the Tribunal award will be less than the
worker expected, that will reduce the weight that the worker gives to the
BAPA element and further shift the balance toward the acceptability of
a proposed settlement. An alternative strategy, one that arguably is more
appropriate to the responsibilities of an impartial intervener, is to provide
such focus on reality regardless of its impact on the likelihood of
settlement.
Another possibility for parties who are unable to find mutually
satisfactory terms of agreement is to terminate the existing contract, as
occurs when a party resorts to a strike, lockout, or unilateral modification
of the terms of employment; when employees seek work elsewhere; or
process); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) (discussing
how mediation in the context of divorce favors the husband over the wife); Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?, 41 FIA. L.
Rsv. 253 (1989) (discussing the importance of a clear conception of the mediator's role,
as related to the formation of guidelines for mediation practice); Kendric Menzel, Judging
the Fairness ofMediation, 9 MEDIATiON Q. 3 (1991); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense
ofMediation, 33 AIZ. L. REV. 467 (1991) (discussing how mediation is generally helpful
to both men and women). For a scathing criticism of one state's experience withjudicially
mandated mediation and arbitration of pre-trial discovery and commercial and personal
inimy disputes, see Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADA, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994,
at 53.
23 COLLINS, supra note 20, at 137-38.
24 Id. at 138-39.
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when an employer transfers work or hires replacement employees. 2
Regardless of whether some or all of these alternatives may be socially
or politically undesirable,26 a mediator may be able to reduce the
transaction costs of resorting to such impasse actions, to the extent that
they are legally permitted, by helping the parties realize that they have
reached a deadlock Moreover, if the reallocation of resources resulting
from such responses to impasse is more satisfying and efficient in the
long run, as sometimes is the case, then the mediator who serves best
may be the one who quickly helps the parties understand that there is no
purpose in prolonging fruitless efforts to bring about a negotiated
solution. Therefore, the analysis that follows accepts the proposition that
mediation can fulfill its role by either aiding the parties in reaching
agreement or in recognizing that they are unable to achieve a mutually
satisfactory settlement.
To illustrate how the bargaining strength model can help improve
one's understanding of the mediator's role and the strategic choices
available to a mediator, one should consider the element identified as the
offer to meet the other's needs (OMEN). A party's needs, as previously
observed, can be physical, fiscal, or emotional. It is easier to shape and
discuss collective bargaining and grievance resolution proposals in terms
of physical and fiscal needs than in terms of emotional needs because the
former needs are more susceptible to measurement, description, and
comparison than are emotional needs. But the added difficulty in
analyzing the emotional aspects does not lessen their importance in
helping the parties settle their differences.27 For example, well-paid
workers employed in a safe, healthy environment may nevertheless be
discontented if they have no sense of voice in determining their employ-
ment destiny. Even when formal structures exist for providing worker
participation in decisions affecting the workers' wellbeing, the workers
may feel that their voices are not heard.
A mediator who is guided by the bargaining strength model should
recognize that one way to increase the weight placed upon the other's
' A comparative examination of the law regulating this alternative to accepting a
proposed negotiated settlement is presented in a forthcoming issue of the Bulletin of
Comparative Labour Relations (R. Ben-Israel, guest ed.).
26In the United States, at least, it has been noted that the political impetus behind
establishing government labor mediation agencies is the goal of preventing wodc
stoppages and terminating those that get started. SpMaN & FIDANDIS, spra note 6, at 32-
33.
' See, e.g., Webb, supra note 7, at 312 (discussing various studies which have
measured the effects of mediation on the parties involved).
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offer to meet needs, and thereby increase the attractiveness of settlement,
is to ensure that the party who is assessing the other's offer feels that the
offer is responsive to its emotional as well as its physical and fiscal
needs. This observation should be no great revelation to successful labor
mediators. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that two of the leading
American texts used to train labor mediators, though giving considerable
attention to the importance of helping parties understand the fiscal
implications of their bargaining positions, at best make only marginal
reference to the emotional needs of the negotiators or their constitu-
ents.n
Recognition of the role that emotional needs play in bargaining
decisions is also noteworthy in that it illustrates another point of
distinction between the microeconomic approach to analysis and the
bargaining strength modeL Emotional needs are individual, malleable,
susceptible to sudden unpredictable changes, often interactive, and not
subject to any current technology for measurement.'s Thus, despite the
theoretical efforts of some economists to convert all interests into market
utilities, emotional needs lack the characteristics necessary to subject
them to market exchanges or market model predictions. Therefore, their
role in bargaining represents a reason why market-based microeconomic
models do not go far to aid understanding of negotiated decisions. °
n See SIMK]N & FIDANDIS, supra note 6, at 28 (stating that "[rlepeated exposure to
sour-yes, occasionally rotten-apples in the collective bargaining barrel requires a strong
stomach"); MAGGIOLO, sqpra note 6, at 73 ("[A] potential mediator ought to possess: ...
'the personality-probing skills of a good psychiatrist.'") (quoting WILIAM E. SmrI]L
MEDIATOR AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTV BARGAINING, BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS (1971)). Some works devoted to broader applications of mediation pay greater
attention to such matters. E.g., Albie Davis, The Logic Behind the Magic of Mediation,
In EXPANDING HORIZONS: THEORY AND RESEARCH IN DISMrE RESOLUTION 23 (Thomas
F. Christian et al eds., 1989) (discussing the humanistic role that the mediator plays).
2 For a description of the emotional dimensions, see GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 13
and 94-99. Sometimes mediators are also able to modify the values by which parties
measure their needs. Instead of just allowing egocentric values to provide the benchmark
for assessment, the mediator can focus on larger values such as community, decency,
integrity, and honor. President Lyndon Johnson's mediation efforts, for example,
apparently involved walking the parties to the American flag in his office, unfurling it,
and proclaiming that the nation needed the parties' cooperation and willingness to
compromise.
30 Microeconomists applying market theory use indifference curve analysis in an
effort to account for variations respecting the priorities assigned by different people to the
same sets of interests that are affected by market choices. WALTER NICHOLSON,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BAsIC PRINCImLES AND EXEN sIONS 82-85 (3d ed. 1985).
Indifference curve analysis examines an individual's choices and motivations by weighing
1993-941
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One way to increase a party's perception of the weight (or value) to
be given to the other side's offer to meet its needs is to enhance the offer.
A mediator who is impartial and lacks bargaining leverage can neverthe-
less serve as a verifier of facts in order to increase a party's perception of
the value of the offer or as a conduit for communication so as to solicit
an increased offer from the other side.
Application of the bargaining strength model in Diagram 3 illustrates
the impact when, all other factors being equal, mediation successfully
increases the parties' perception of the extent that their respective
proposals meet the other's needs. The model confirms the intuitive
expectation that a successful mediation effort of this sort will increase the
prospects for agreement.
In addition to the above discussed techniques, a mediator sometimes
has the ability to alter not merely the perception but also the reality of the
extent to which needs are met. In such a situation, the mediator can
change the prospects of settlement by exercising that ability to modify
directly the value of the offer. The very suggestion that a mediator might
play such a role is contrary to many doctrinal accounts seen in the United
States respecting the proper role of mediation." Yet, an examination of
what level of one benefit they will give up if compensated with more of another.
Although indifference curve analysis may be an effective way to model and predict
certain types of economic decisions, such as the impact of changes in interest or tax rates,
it is unsuited for dealing with complex negotiated transactions in which the decisional
process involves efforts to modify the participants' priorities. Indifference curve analysis
assumes stable preference ordering and rational choices to maximize satisfaction when
substitutions are made. Behavioral studies show, however, that human choice often is not
rational; it is influenced by such things as the language and context in which the choices
me presented and invalid perceptions of statistical probability. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, sipra
note 1, at 148-58, 168-70. Nor are all decision makers seeking to maximize satisfaction.
Various types of neurotic behavior cause some people to make choices that reduce rather
than increase their satisfaction, perhaps when transacting with particular categories of
people. See id. at 101-04, 111-15. Moreover, decisional preferences can be interactive. For
example, if A anticipates that B will offer a small wage increase in exchange for A's
offring to reduce the number of seniority classifications, but B responds with a larger-
than-expected wage increase offer, A may start to suspect that B anticipates laying off a
large number of workers and may then reassess the relative priority that A gives to job
security demands. Similarly, indifference curve analysis would appear to assume that if
AB>CD, AB>DF, and AB>EF but AB<CF, then AB>DE. It would reject the proposition
that if AB>CD, AB>DF, and AB>EF but AB<CF, then AB<DE. Yet, if A=pickles,
B=-bologna, C--onions, D=bananas, Evice cream, and F=fried potatoes, one might
rationally prefer the second 'irrational" preference ordering. Such a result would not be
predicted by the abstract logic that is at the core of indifference curve analysis.
31 See MAGGIOLO, supra note 6, at 12 (writing of the intercession of an uninterested
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anything inherently inappropriate about a mediator modifying bargaining
strength, and thereby increasing the prospect for settlement, by directly
increasing the extent to which an offer meets a party's needs.
Indeed, in some industrial relations systems, settlement is accom-
plished by mediators who are armed with the authority to alter the extent
to which physical and fiscal needs are met. For example, in Italy, political
authorities often engage in mediatory efforts separate from the official
public mediator's activity.' The intervention by such political mediators,
which is reported to be "quite appreciated by the parties,"3 often
succeeds because the intervener is able to offer concrete benefits in
exchange for the parties' acceptance of a proposed agreement.' Similar
interventions are reported to be encountered in Israel' and occasionally
in Sweden.'
A number of labor law systems also give mediators the power to
influence or control the resolution that will be imposed upon the parties
if a negotiated settlement is not reached3 7 In terms of the bargaining
strength model, the mediator's influence over the best alternative to the
proposed agreement (BAPA) in such a situation enables him to modify
the parties' perception of the weight to be given to that bargaining
strength element. Thus, where, as in the Australian conciliation-arbitration
model for resolving labor relations disputes, failure to reach agreement
normally results in arbitration by the same official who acted as
conciliator, that official's persuasive efforts as a bargaining intervener will
carry special weight.' Analyzing this situation using the bargaining
strength model, one finds that the weight of the predictive ability (PA) to
determine the best alternative to the proposed agreement (BAPA) would
be considerably increased for both sides if the conciliator were to
announce the anticipated terms of an arbitrated award. In theory, at least,
3 Treu, mupra note 5, at 356, 374, 380.
" Id. at 380.
3 Id.
3s Ruth Ben-Israel & Mordehai Mironi, The Role of Neutrals in the Resolution of
Interest Disputes in Israel, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 356, 363 (1989) (discussing mediation in
Israel -by third parties who possess an influence that they use as leverage over the
disputans).
36 Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Role ofNeutrals in the Resolution of Interest Dbputes in
Sweden, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 391, 399, 404-05 (1989).
31 See Isaac & McCallum, siupra note 19, at 304 ("If conciliation does not resolve
all the issues in dispute, the conciliator puts on the arbitrator's hat, and arbitration
proceedings commence.".
31 Id. ("Having two hats allows the third party this element of flexibflity between
conciliation and arbitration.").
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such an announcement should leave the parties with little incentive to
continue to seek a negotiated award. Accordingly, an interesting field test
of the bargaining strength model would be available if such revelation
were the practice of some but not all Australian conciliators. Any
correlation between the two practices and the relative frequency of set-
tlement agreements could then be examined. In reality, however,
Australian labor conciliators generally appear to avoid making such
predictions, and when they do, the party disfavored by the prediction
typically requests that another conciliator be substituted for the arbitral
stage of the conflict resolution. 9 Thus, this potential field test of the
bargaining strength model is not currently possible.
Another variation in labor mediation systems is where the mediator
has the authority to forestall resort to unilateral changes or work
stoppages. This variation occurs, for example, in the rail and airline
industries in the United States, where the National Mediation Board must
declare a bargaining impasse before the parties can resort to self-help.'
No matter how long it has been since any negotiating progress has been
made, the parties may not lawfully make unilateral changes or resort to
work stoppages or related activities until an official declaration of
impasse has been issued.4' Under such circumstances, the mediation
agency has the power effectively to freeze the status quo,42 thereby
depriving the parties of the opportunity to resort to what they consider to
be their best alternative to the proposed agreement (BAPA). Of course,
whether the mediation agency's authority strengthens or weakens a
particular party's bargaining position depends upon which side prefers the
status quo to the proposed changes. Applying the bargaining strength
model in Diagram 4, one can see that if a party that has been holding out
at the bargaining table is persuaded that the mediation agency will not
declare an impasse, then that party loses much of its incentive to resist
settlement. Once a party is convinced that the agency will not declare an
impasse (Party B reaches that conclusion in Diagram 4), the weight to be
placed on the best alternative to the proposed agreement (BAPA)
" Interview with R. . Meldejohn, Industrial Officer, Australasian Meat Industry
Employees' Union (Queensland Branch), Aug. 23, 1992.
40 E.g., International Association of Machinists v. National Mediation Bd., 930 F.2d
45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deied, 112 S. Ct. 173 (1991) (holding that the Board's failure to
issue a declaration of impasse prohibited resort to unilateral changes or work stoppages
even though the agency chairman had obierved that mediation had failed after a year's
effort that had followed ten months of unsuccessful bargaining without mediation).
4' For a discussion of the National Mediation Board, see MAGGioLO, supra note 6,
at 68-70.
4 Id. at 69-70.
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becomes zero. Even though the value of the linked element of predictive
ability to determine the nature of that alternative may as a result become
rather large, the combined effect is to eliminate these factors in weighing
bargaining strength. Hence, no reason to further resist the proposed
settlement may remain.
Conditions Conducive to Settlement = A's Perception Of:
POPs DAA
+
(A is likely to settle) (A is unlikely to settle)
PLUS B's Perception
POPA  DAB+
(B is likely to settle)
PAB PAB
(B is unlikely to settle)
OMON= Offer to Meet Other's Needs
POP = Probability of Performance
AC = Accrued Costs
DA = Data Accuracy
PA = Predictive Accuracy
BAPA = Best Alternative to the
Proposed Agreement
COIN = Cost of Impending Negotiations
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Another illustration of how the bargaining strength model can be used
to gain a more precise understanding of the dynamics of labor mediation
involves using a different paradigm of analysis-the paradigm showing the
parties' relative bargaining strength.
The highly skilled negotiator is one who utilizes the full potential of
his or her bargaining strength. Most negotiators (in reality, probably all
negotiators) lack the skill consistently to discover the full extent of that
potential or how to use it. Often mediators can help a negotiator discover
areas of potential bargaining power that have been overlooked or can
suggest or even assist in finding ways to utilize that potential. Such
assistance alters the parties' relative bargaining strengths. At times, such
intervention can have the appearance or be the product of partiality and
can thus violate any expectations or representations of the third party's
impartiality. Yet, both sides are sometimes served by such mediatory
efforts because the efforts result in a mutually satisfactory settlement.
As a demonstration of the foregoing observation, assume that a
British manager of a recently purchased plant located in the United States
is renegotiating a collective agreement and that the British manager,
though familia with labor-management relations in his own country, is
only vaguely familiar with the American system. Due to the level of
verbal harshness, aggressiveness, and discourtesy on the part of the
American union representatives, the manager feels that the relationship is
totally adversary and thus warrants a very cautious approach. The union
offers a concession to eliminate some work rule provisions in exchange
for an improved benefit. The manager asks: "How do I know that in two
months you will not turn around and come forward with a grievance
seeking to reinstate the work rule?" A union representative responds: "If
we put it in writing, then that ends the matter-there can be no changes."
Thinking this statement to be mere rhetoric and not being aware of the
fact that, unlike the British system, collective agreements are legally
binding and enforceable in the United States, the British manager resists
the proposal. A mediator is called, learns of this exchange, and, sensing
the source of the manager's resistance, explains the legal mechanisms for
enforcing collective agreements in the United States. The credibility of
hearing this explanation from an impartial officer persuades the manager
to accept the proposal, and soon the parties reach settlement.
As Diagram 1 indicates, what the mediator has done in the above
illustration is modify the manager's perception of the union's probability
of performance (POP) and, consequently, increase the weight that the
manager gives to that element. This change in perception, in turn, swings
the balance for the employer further in the direction of settlement.
Similarly, if the union perceives that the improved benefit that it sought
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better serves its members' needs than the sacrificed work rule, then the
effect of management's acceptance of the proposal is to increase the
weight that the union assigns to management's offer to meet the union's
needs (OMON). This change, of course, moves the balance for the union
further in the direction of settlement, which is a result that is consistent
with the mediator's role.
In addition to the mediator's influence on the parties' perceptions,
what the mediator has done in terms of modifying the parties' bargaining
strength is significant. The diagram on the next page demonstrates that
the immediate effect of providing the legal information to the manager
was to increase the employer's perception of the union's probability of
performance which, in turn, increased the union's bargaining strength.
That is, the impartial party's conduct improved one side's bargaining
strength. This change then helped management improve its own
bargaining strength by agreeing to terms that the union found more
attractive. Thus, one of the lessons to be learned from the bargaining
strength analysis of mediation is that effective mediation, no matter how
impartial, inevitably must have an impact on bargaining power.
Settling for More presents and examines the paradigms of bargaining
strength for the purpose of improving practical understanding of the
strategic choices and styles encountered in negotiating. For this reason,
the book's discussion stops short of exploring the theoretical implications
respecting the optimal point for accepting an offer. Another reason for
avoiding analysis of the optimal point for accepting an offer is that such
an approach assumes that there is a set of proposals which clearly
provides greater benefits to one party or all parties. The danger of such
analysis is that it carries the false implication that negotiating parties and
mediators should direct their efforts toward discovering that optimal
solution. Although understanding the theoretical point of optimal solution
offers some insights into the bargaining process, it is important to not
confuse that benefit with the realities of bargaining. While an optimal
solution may be available in theory, such a solution rarely exists or can
be identified in reality. Therefore, before examining the theoretical
optimal point of settlement, one should review the reasons why too often
a search for that solution will be a futile exercise.
Settling for More observes that needs can be physical, fiscal, or
emotional 43 Generally, the first two categories are susceptible to
measurement, though situations clearly exist in which reliable measure-
ment, or even any measurement, is not possible. For example, people
- GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 13.
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have different perceptions at different times respecting their caloric needs.
How much food one thinks is necessary to satiate hunger varies with such
factors as whether one has begun to eat or is waiting to begin, whether
one is eating vegetables or meat, and whether one is consuming liquids
or solids. Similarly, the time of day, prior activities, the surrounding
setting, and the activities that are scheduled to follow the meal, all
influence the perception of one's physical need for food. Moreover, no
common unit exists for measuring such needs. Hence, because of the lack
of a -fixed means for calculating impact, logic is unable to dictate a
"correct" solution when weighing choices affecting physical needs.
Even though a fixed unit of measurement exists for calculating the
impact of different choices affecting fiscal needs, logic is often incapable
of dictating a correct solution in this situation as well. One reason is that
the "value" of money is itself a matter of perception. The opportunity to
earn five hundred dollars carries very different weight for a homeless
person than for a wealthy person. Moreover, in business transactions it is
often difficult to measure costs and values because available information
is not, and cannot be, perfect. Thus, the seller of real estate does not
know whether a buyer will call two minutes later in order to make a more
generous offer. Nor can the cost accountant for the retailer, manufacturer,
finance company, or almost any type of business say with certainty how
to allocate properly overhead expenses among the enterprise's various
activities.
Logic is even less capable of dictating solutions to negotiating
choices when emotional needs are involved, since the parties themselves
are often incapable of consistently ranking their preferences, let alone
recognizing the degree of difference among available choices. Hence, it
is not uncommon for people to speak of being "torn between' the desire
for (or repulsion toward) choice "A" and choice "B." Accordingly, in
constructing and presenting the theoretical model demonstrating the point
of optimal solution to a negotiated transaction, it is stressed that this is
done not for the purpose of describing how negotiators act or should act,
but rather to better understand how the process may be affected when
impartial intervention becomes part of the bargaining structure. With that
caution in mind, a fifMh paradigm can be extrapolated from the bargaining
strength model. This fifth paradigm, which is summarized below in
symbolic logic, describes the theoretical point at which an offer should
be accepted.
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In representing the Optimal Point for A's acceptance of B's offer, the
following symbols are used:
P = Perception
OMON = Offer to Meet the Other's Needs
OMON' = Prospective Offer to Meet Other's Needs
POP = Probability of Performance
DA = Data Accuracy
AC = Accrued Costs
BAPA = Best Alternative to the Proposed Agreement
COIN = Cost of Implementing Negotiations
PA = Predictive Accuracy
Thus, the Optimal Point for A'sAcceptance of B's Offer is when:
PA = OMON (POP.) > BAPAA (PAA) - [AC A (DAA) + COINA (PAA)J
and
[OMON, (POP.) - ACA (DA)] > OMONB' (POP,) - [COIN4 (PAA) + AC4 (DAA)]
Further analysis of the above paradigm, using the tools of algebraic logic,
reveals that it can be more simply stated as:
P = OMON, (POP.) > BAPAA (PAA)
and
OMON, (POP.) > OMONB (POP) - COIN4 (PAA)
which can also be stated as:
PA = OMONg (POPB) > BAPAA (PAA)
and
OMONB (POPS) + COIN4 (PAA) > OMONB (POP)
This last version of the paradigm statement has the advantage of ready
transformation into the same type of graphic representation used in
describing the other paradigms offered in Settling for More. This graphic
representation is shown in the following diagram.
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The process of simplifying the statement of the optimal point for
accepting the other side's offer involved disregarding the weight of the
joint Accrued Costs/Data Accuracy bargaining strength elements. Those
joined bargaining strength elements should not affect the decision to
accept an offer instead of attempting to elicit other more attractive offers
because what has already been expended in the negotiating effort is no
longer within the negotiator's control. However, the joint Accrued
Costs/Data Accuracy elements should play a role in one other strategic
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negotiating decision that can be guided by the bargaining strength model.
That decision is whether to abandon negotiating efforts with the other
side. A final paradigm describes that situation as follows:
A Should Abandon Negotiating with B if:
PA = BAPAA (PAA) + ACA (DAA) + COINA (PAA) > OMON' (POPB)
This symbolic statement can be graphically presented as:
A Should Abandon Bargaining with B if A's Perception =
PAA PAA
Abandon Bargaining
~0
Continue Bargaining
This final paradigm is particularly useful in understanding why the way
to assess benefits of mediation, if any, is to examine the impact of
mediation upon bargaining costs in relation to the mediator's ability to
alter the parties' perceptions of the extent to which current or impending
offers meet their needs.
The above added paradigms demonstrate that the costs of bargaining
(AC and COIN) affect not only bargaining power, but also the net benefit
of the ultimate resolution reached, whether that resolution is a negotiated
settlement (acceptance of OMON) or resort to an alternative to the
proposed agreement (BAPA). Thus, the costs of negotiating reduce the
net benefit of a negotiated agreement unless the bargaining activity
produces a settlement the perceived increased attractiveness of which
(increase in the value placed on OMON, POP, or both) exceeds the cost
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of bargaining. For example, suppose it costs Party A $1,000 per day to
negotiate with Party B, and the first day of bargaining results in B
modifying his proposal so as to increase its perceived value to A by
$5,000. Suppose, too, that the second day of bargaining results in B
modifying his proposal so as to increase A's perception of its value to A
by $3,000, but the third day of bargaining results in modifications that
only enhance the value in A's eyes by $500. Finally, suppose that after
the third day, A is convinced that B has reached his limit and will offer
no further modifications favorable to A. A's net benefit from the first day
of bargaining was $4,000 ($5,000 - $1,000). At the end of the second
day, A's net negotiating benefit was $6,000 ($8,000 - $2,000), and at the
end of the third day, it was $5,500 ($8,500 - $3,000). Assuming that A
has perfect knowledge and foresight, A should have obviously either
accepted what was offered at the end of the second day or resorted to her
best alternative to the proposed agreement.
Similarly, the net benefit from resorting to one's best alternative to a
proposed agreement is reduced by all of the bargaining costs incurred
prior to turning to that alternative. Of course, those costs will occasionally
result in an increase in the perceived value of the alternative (increase in
the value placed on BAPA, PA, or both) and that increase will exceed the
bargaining costs. An example of this situation would be where the best
alternative is an adjudicated resolution and in the course of bargaining a
party learns information that significantly increases its perception that
adjudication will provide an attractive result.
Sometimes mediation prolongs the negotiating process; other times,
it shortens the process." Prolonging negotiations is almost certain to be
accompanied by increased bargaining costs. If mediation prolongs
bargaining and fails either to increase the parties' perceptions of the value
of their proposals or their alternatives, the intervention becomes a burden
to them. Moreover, if the costs of prolonging negotiations burden the
parties unevenly, then their respective bargaining strengths may be altered
and the prospective negotiated outcome may thus be affected.
To illustrate this last point, assume that an employee working in a
hypothetical country asserts that he was wrongfully dismissed and that in
this country a wrongfully dismissed worker has a claim for judicial relief
measured in monetary damages. Assume further that under the law of this
hypothetical country, the parties must submit to mediation for up to six
months before such a suit can be filed. Finally, assume that the employer
'A See generally Webb, supra note 7, at 312-21 (discussing the experimental study
of mediation).
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and worker both estimate that an eighty percent chance exists that the
worker will be awarded $9,000-10,000 in damages if the dispute goes to
trial.
Arithmetically, a settlement for $7,600 in this situation would be
reasonable for both sides. This figure results from using the median point
of $9,500 in the estimated damages award and reducing it by the eighty
percent prospect that the litigation will succeed. This calculation of a
reasonable settlement figure disregards, however, the fact that in any
system of fair adjudicative procedures, some delay will occur between the
commencement of the suit and the final decision. In addition, experience
teaches that often a further delay occurs between the time that the
decision is given and the time that the judgment is paid. During the
period of delay, the prospective winner does not have the benefit of the
funds to be awarded. Accordingly, if the parties estimate that it will take
six months to get an adjudicated award, and if one assumes that the
employer can borrow money at ten percent interest and the worker at
twenty percent interest, then the present value to the employer of a
$7,600 prospect of litigated liability in six months is $7,238 ($7,238 plus
ten percent of $7,238 for six months = $7,600) and the present value to
the worker of that award six months hence is $6,909 ($6,909 plus twenty
percent of $6,909 for six months = $7,600). Therefore, if the award does
not carry interest equal to the worker's cost of borrowing, any delay in
working out a negotiated settlement or in obtaining a litigated award
works to the employer's benefit. Thus, if mediation results in a delay of
an additional six months before the suit can even be brought and a one-
year delay in the prospective receipt of an award, then the present value
to the employer of that ultimate liability is $6,909 and the present value
to the worker of that prospective award is $6,333. Hence, without the
delay of mediation, an immediate settlement offer of $7,000 made by the
employer should be attractive to the worker because it exceeds the present
value of a reasonable estimate of the prospective recovery by $81.
(Moreover, the employer should be willing to make the offer because it
is $238 less than the present value of its potential liability.) In compari-
son, because of the prospect of an additional delay of six months if a
period of mediation is mandatory, the employer could reduce its offer by
$586 (ie., offer $6,414) and still be offering $81 more than the p esent
value of a reasonable estimate of the prospective recovery to the vorker.
Mediation has the potential of aiding the parties and the public by
helping disputants resolve their conflicts more quickly and, 1where
appropriate, by ensuring that negotiated resolutions reflect public values
of fairness and communal interests, as well as the parties' j rivate
concerns. The foregoing analysis warns, however, that one should not
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make the mistake of assuming that mediation is without potential
drawbacks. Mediation can delay rather than hasten resolution and can
alter the parties' relative bargaining strengths in ways that do not serve
public interests.
According to the fifth paradigm, if policy makers want to facilitate
negotiated settlements while minimizing intrusions upon the parties'
relative bargaining strengths, they should weigh the extent to which
increased costs of impending negotiations (COIN) may exceed the
expected enhancement of one or both sides' perceptions of the value of
the other's offer (OMON) or probability of performance (POP). In
contrast, if policy makers want to deter resort to certain forms of
alternatives to the proposed agreement (BAPA), such as work stoppages
or other industrial actions, or want to reshape one or both sides'
proposals, then the choice of whether to mandate mediation should
compare the impact of the increased cost of bargaining (AC and COIN)
in altering the parties' relative bargaining strengths with the mediator's
prospects of altering the parties' perceptions of the other bargaining
strength elements.
The introductory caution to presenting the paradigms for optimal
bargaining decisions emphasized the barriers to rational decision making
which result from the reality of having to function with incomplete
knowledge and having to weigh competing considerations without an
established unit of measurement. Additionally, bargaining transactions do
not resemble linear or geometric relationships; rather, they most closely
resemble biological processes in which the patterns of change do not
always follow predictable paths or fixed time sequences. 5 Although
these.characteristics inevitably frustrate the participants' efforts at reliable
prediction, an examination of the causes for that frustration suggests
appropriate tactics that a mediator, or the parties on their own, might
pursue.
For example, although no units of measurement exist for calculating
the impact of emotional needs, a mediator can move the parties closer to
settlement by attending to those needs. That attention can fall into two
categories: finding a way to remove the emotional needs or discovering
a way to satisfy those needs at little or no cost. An illustration of a
mediator assisting by removing emotional needs arises when the mediator
detects that representatives for one or both sides are using the negotiation
to meet their own emotional needs (whether, for example, security, love,
amusement, personal achievement, or social status) instead of the needs
45 GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 229-31.
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of their principal(s). One technique that a mediator can use in such
circumstances is to remind the representatives of their fiduciary responsi-
bilities (for example, "I understand that you are demanding an apology,
but how does that serve the interests of the shareholders whom you
represent?"). When the mediator perceives that a party is holding out
because emotional needs are not being met, the mediator may be able to
remind that person of ways in which his or her emotional needs are met
outside the framework of negotiating. An anecdote about the satisfaction
that a common acquaintance gets from charitable work, a hobby, or even
going to the track can provide a subtle means of reminding the party that
the stakes involved in the particular bargaining transaction do not
summarize that person's access to status or well being. In some instances,
the mediator may be able to demonstrate to the party that an emotional
need perceived to be inhibiting settlement has already been met through
other means. For example, the mediator's expressed acknowledgement of
the party's social status or personal achievements may, on occasion, be
adequate to remove those concerns from the bargaining table.
Similarly, sometimes a mediator can move the parties toward settle-
ment by helping to meet emotional needs at little or no additional cost.
The strokes given by the mediator through the use of honorifics,
compliments, and even attentive listening to their stories, opinions, and
complaints can satisfy some emotional needs and thereby remove them
as dimensions of the elements of bargaining strength. Often a valuable
function of mediation in the settlement of litigation is to bring the parties
face to face and give them a chance to express, and thereby to purge,
their ill or hurt feelings toward each other. While the attorneys can do
this by mutual agreement, many are reluctant to have their clients present
during settlement discussions, perhaps out of fear of an admission against
interest. Yet, these same lawyers tend to be amenable to a mediation ar-
rangement in which the mediator can bring the disputants together for a
mutual opportunity to vent their feelings. Experienced lawyers and
mediators report that a catharsis often results from which emerges a
settlement on terms that previously would have been unacceptable to one
or both sides.m " Alternatively, where a party appears to be insecure about
accepting a proposed settlement, a mediator may offer suggestions for
ways to increase the perception of the probability of performance'
' The author is particularly grateful to Wayne Outten, of Lankenau, Kovner & Jurtz
in New York City, who is a very experienced employment law plaintiff's attorney, for
impressing upon him this potential value of mediation.
47 GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 180-92.
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In summary, deciding whether and when mediation will be a
constructive force in resolving employment-related disputes requires that
the structure and operations of the proposed process be analyzed in terms
of the elements of bargaining strength and the impact of mediatory
interventions upon those elements and their relationships. In addition, the
prospects for successful mediation are improved if the mediator takes
guidance from the bargaining strength model in searching for ways to
move the parties' perceptions and understanding of the status of their
deliberations so as to bring them closer to the theoretical optimal point
for settlement.
